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ABSTRACT: Private and public health insurance programs by
their selectivity of coverage and means of payment add to the
fragmentation and inefficiencies of the health care sector. The
proposals for the establishment of some form of national
health insurance presented in the more than forty bills before
Congress incorporate a wide range of approaches to financing,
benefits, accountability, and regulation. This paper elucidates
the key policy variables in terms of whose dimensions the dif-
ferent proposals may be analyzed, and some criteria for evalu-
ating their different aspects. The three major proposals&mdash;by
the Nixon Administration, Senator Edward Kennedy, and the
American Medical Association&mdash;are detailed and their probable
effects discussed. The choice is not between financing mecha-
nisms as such but rather between different systems for provid-
ing medical care. Although none of the proposed plans would
assure equal access to needed care for all, the Kennedy Plan
goes furthest in that direction.
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Whether poor or not, most Americans
are badly served by the obsolete,
over-strained medical system that
has grown up around them, helter-
skelter, without accommodating very
well to changing technology, expand-
ing population, rising costs, or rising
expectations....
Fortune magazine 1
IN THE CIVILIAN population, about81 percent of all individuals under
the age of 65 are covered by one or more
health insurance plans issued by private
companies. Those over 65 are, by and
large, eligible for public insurance bene-
fits under the provisions of Medicare,
although 50 percent have some form of
supplemental private coverage. Cover-
age by type of service for which the in-
surance pays the benefits of the under-
65 group, the focus of public policy,
varies greatly. Thus, while 81 percent
have hospital benefits, 43 percent have
some physician office and home visit
benefits, and less than 5 percent have
insurance covering dental care.2 2
Private as well as public insurance is
not designed to meet the total cost of
the services for which it is written.
Deductible amounts and co-payments
are incorporated in most policies.3
In fiscal year 1970, the latest period
for which data are available, of the
total national health expenditures of $67
billion, 63 percent, or $42 billion, were
outlays by the private sector for direct
1>ayments for services, health insurance
premiums, construction of medical fa-
cilities, and research.4 Expenditures for
personal health care, excluding construc-
tion and research, were $58 billion, of
which $37.5 billion were private out-
lays. Direct payment for services and
for insurance costs amounted to $23
billion, or 61 percent. Private insurance
benefits were $14 billion, about 39 per-
cent of private expenditures.5 5
Gaps in coverage, together with the
effects of co-payments and deductibles,
resulted in uneven benefit payments.
Thus, 30 percent of private hospital ex-
penses, 57 percent of physician ex-
penses, and 95 percent of other health
care costs, including dental, optometric,
prescription, and nursing home services,
were not met by insurance payments
and were paid for directly by the indi-
viduals concerned 6
The current health insurance system
introduces two basic forms of distortion
to the provision of medical care services.
In situations when medically considered
appropriate services may be provided in
alternative ways, both the patient and
the physicians are likely to choose the
way covered by insurance, whether or
not that is economically efficient. Se-
lective insurance reduces the relative
price facing the patient and assures
payment to the physician of the set of
covered services, whether alternatives
exist or not. Thus, for those who have
hospital coverage but not ambulatory
benefits, it is less costly to be hospital-
ized for a sequence of diagnostic x-rays
and laboratory work even though the
services could be equally well provided
1. Anonymous editorial, "It’s Time To Op-
erate," Fortune 81, 1 (January, 1970), p. 79.
2. Marjorie Smith Mueller, "Private Health
Insurance in 1969: A Review," Social Security
Bulletin 34, 2 (February, 1971), p. 4.
3. A deductible amount is an amount in
dollars that the beneficiary must pay out of
pocket before the benefits take effect. A
co-payment, often euphemistically called co-
insurance, is an amount expressed as a per-
centage of total costs that the beneficiary has
to pay out of pocket. Thus, a policy with a
$50 deductible and 20 percent co-payment
will pay 80 percent of the cost of services cov-
ered after the first $50 expenditure by the
beneficiary. Policies also usually have upper
dollar or specific service limitations per period
of time.
4. Dorothy P. Rice and Barbara S. Cooper,
"National Health Expenditures, 1929-1970,"
Social Security Bulletin 34, 1 (January, 1971),
p. 5.
5. Ibid., p. 15.
6. Mueller, op. cit., p. 18.
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at significantly lower cost on an ambu-
latory basis.’ The insurance mechanism
itself, therefore, offers an inducement for
an inefficient use of resources because of
its selectivity.
Inefficiencies and cost escalation are
also invited by the form in which bene-
fits are paid. With extremely few ex-
ceptions, health insurance plans are
written to pay the provider of service on
a &dquo;cost plus&dquo; basis: hospitals are reim-
bursed for &dquo;reasonable costs&dquo; of provid-
ing care, and physicians at &dquo;usual and
prevailing&dquo; charges. The providers,
therefore, not only have no incentives to
choose efficient and less costly ways of
supplying care but, on the contrary, are
indirectly encouraged to use resource-
intensive processes and to charge what
the market will bear. Further, since the
insurance carriers have rarely engaged
in cost control and the patient pays the
premium, the providers are in the best
of possible economic worlds: I call the
tune and you pay the piper. The at-
tempt to eliminate these distortions has
been an important factor in the develop-
ment of prepaid group practices, which
for prepayment on a per capita basis
agree to provide a comprehensive set of
medically useful services to their mem-
bers.8
Selective private health insurance is
both a part of the &dquo;helter-skelter&dquo; medi-
cal care sector and a collective private
system to finance at least some of the
costs without disturbing any of the pres-
ent relationships. National Health In-
surance is a public system for the col-
lective financing of privately provided
services incorporating different degrees
of public planning and control.
SOME HISTORY AND SOME PROBLEMS
The gestation period of this idea
whose time seems to have arrived is
much longer than it would appear.
Commissions to study the feasibility of
social health insurance were established
in several states as early as 1910 to
1915, to the general approbation of the
American Medical Association (AMA),
which in 1915 noted:
The failure of many persons in this country
at present to receive medical care consti-
tutes the best argument for a change to
the more effectual provision of medical
attention offered by health insurance.9
With attention diverted from social
legislation by the First World War, fol-
lowed by the euphoria of the Roaring
Twenties, it was not until 1932 that the
issue was resurrected by the Committee
on Medical Care recommendation for
substantial changes in the system. The
Minority Report prepared by represent-
atives of the AMA was opposed to any
national system but argued:
To recommend that our own country again
experiment with discredited methods of
voluntary insurance is simply to ignore all
that has been learned by costly experience
in many other countries as well as our
own.10
7. This price-distorting effect of selective
health insurance has been much discussed in
terms of "moral hazard." See Kenneth J.
Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Eco-
nomics of Medical Care," American Economic
Review, December, 1963, p. 941, and "Com-
ments" by Pauly and Arrow, loc. cit., June,
1968, p. 531.
8. See, for example, "Group Practice: Prob-
lems and Perspectives," Bulletin of the New
York Academy of Medicine 44, 11 (November,
1968), pp. 1277-1434. For a critical economic
evaluation see Herbert E. Klarman, "Ap-
proaches to Moderating the Increases in Medi-
cal Care Costs," Medical Care 7, 3 (May-
June, 1969), pp. 175, 179-184.
9. Journal of the AMA, October 30, 1915, p.
1560, quoted in Elton Rayack, Professional
Power and American Medicine (Cleveland:
World, 1967), p. 138.
10. Medical Care for the American People,
Final Report of the Committee on the Costs
of Medical Care (adopted October 31, 1932).
Reprinted, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education,
and Welfare, 1970, Public Health Service,
Health Services and Mental Health Adminis-
tration, Community Health Service, p. 164.
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Therefore, the AMA argument followed,
if there is to be national health insurance
at all, it should be &dquo;a compulsory plan
under government control.&dquo; But the
AMA had soon changed its tune to one
which still reverberates today:
Some people think that people are entitled
to health care as a matter of right, whether
they work or not. This is just as absurd
as saying that food, clothing and shelter
are a matter of right-one step further
than that is a revolutionary system border-
ing on Communism....11
The active opposition of the nation’s
physicians, combined with the shift of
priorities away from health associated
with the Depression and World War II,
led to another period of dormancy. It
was not until 1943 that this idea con-
ceived thirty-three years previously be-
gan to demonstrate some new signs of
life with the introduction of the Wagner-
M urray- Dingell Bill. Since then, not a
single session of Congress in the ensuing
twenty-nine years has been without the
introduction of a bill for some form of
national health insurance.l2
The periodicity of the political history
of national health insurance found its
reflection in the analytic debate, not to
say debatable analyses. The next to
the last round was ushered in with the
statement: &dquo;An examination of the eco-
nomic issues of compulsory health in-
surance is today of first importance.&dquo; 13
That was 1952. It is now 1972, and
while the current student may have re-
course to some technically enlightening
analyses he will find no generally ac-
cepted procedures, objectives, or as-
sumptions-except one: that national
health insurance will be costly.
The successes of economics flow from
the development of sophisticated ana-
lytic techniques to derive the not always
obvious implications of some rather sim-
ple, if strong, assumptions, such as
profit maximization as the objective of
firms and preference maximization, that
of consumers. While it could be shown
that private interaction through the
market system would lead to an optimal
solution of the problem of resource allo-
cation if certain competitive conditions
were met-chief among them the use
of market-determined competitive prices
as allocative signals-it is precisely in
the two problem areas characteristic of
the medical care sector that economic
analysis is weakest. These are the
issues of distributional equity and allo-
cational efficiency under circumstances
when either the private markets that
exist function poorly, or markets as
such are unacceptable allocators because
of ethical judgments about the circum-
stances and outcomes.
&dquo;Medical care is a right&dquo; is the clich6
of the year. Judged by the disparity
between stated objectives and observed
actions, it is hypocrisy as well. Never-
theless, it is both useful and symbolic-
useful because it reiterates a desirable
objective; symbolic because it recognizes
that medical care services cannot and
11. Edward R. Annis, M.D., former presi-
dent of the AMA, quoted in The New York
Times, October 14, 1971.
12. For a brief history, see W. J. Cohen,
"National Health Insurance&mdash;Problems and
Prospects," the 1970 Michael M. Davis Lec-
ture, Center for Health Administration Studies,
Graduate School of Business, University of
Chicago.
13. R. R. Campbell and W. G. Campbell,
"Compulsory Health Insurance: The Eco-
nomic Issues," Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 66, 1 (February, 1952), p. 1. See also I. S.
Falk, "The Economic Issues of Compulsory
Health Insurance: Comment," ibid., 66, 4
(November, 1952), pp. 572-591; R. R. Camp-
bell and W. G. Campbell, "The Economic
Issues of Compulsory Health Insurance: Re-
ply" ibid., 67, 1 (February, 1953), pp. 125-
135; A. Kemp, "Health Services and Political
Economy," Modern Age 7 (Summer, 1963),
pp. 255-268.
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should not be dispensed solely via un-
constrained private markets
One of the principal reasons for doubt
about the desirability of market alloca-
tion of medical services is also the basic
source of difficulty in public policy
analysis: if the values of avoiding, lim-
iting, or postponing anxiety, pain, de-
bility, and death are not appropriately
reflected in the market-determined fees
of medical services, how then do we
measure the benefits of public programs?
The benefits of any program, be they
increased accessibility to providers,
more effective preventive care, reduced
morbidity and mortality, or, in general,
higher levels of health, are extremely
difficult to measure even for those who
believe that they are not largely inde-
pendent of the quantity and quality of
medical care.l5 Money costs, on the
other hand, are more easily definable
and measurable. As a result, the &dquo;in-
tangible&dquo; benefits tend to be vaguely
defined while the analyses in terms of
concrete dollar costs march toward their
asymmetric conclusions. This basic
analytic asymmetry must be borne in
mind, for the advocates of comprehensive
compulsory national health insurance
are not a set of politically masochistic
profligates nor professional do-gooders
bent on doing-in the AMA. The advo-
cates of national health insurance, like
the then ridiculed and now imitated
Keynesians of the late 1930’s, in fact
believe that the way to keep and to im-
prove the desirable elements of the cur-
rent private system of medical care,
while at the same time assuring the
availability and accessibility of high
quality care at adequate levels to all
Americans at reasonable cost, is through
the establishment of a national system of
financing, planning, and control.
THE DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE
National health insurance (NHI)
schemes run a continuum from com-
pulsory plans providing total health care
within a reorganized system to all
members of the population, which we
might call &dquo;Total, Comprehensive, Com-
pulsory&dquo; (TCC), to plans designed to
provide limited benefits to defined pop-
ulation categories with minor adjust-
ments in the current system, on a volun-
tary basis, which may be called &dquo;Lim-
ited, Categorical, Voluntary&dquo; (LCV).
Some forty bills currently introduced in
both Houses of Congress cover the en-
tire spectrum of variability.16 They
have but three common denominators:
(1) a recognition that something is
wrong; (2) the acceptance of the in-
surance principle; and (3) the need for
some governmental intervention. That
is, the schemes call for one or another
version of a financing mechanism to
cover the costs of privately provided
services and not for the direct provision
of medical services by a &dquo;national
health service.&dquo; This last is their
principal difference from systems in
other industrialized countries. 17
The objectives any plan is designed
to attain and the likelihood that it in
fact will do so may be laid bare and
14. See, for instance, Avedis Donabedian,
"Social Responsibility for Personal Health
Services: An Examination of Basic Values,"
Inquiry 8, 2 (June, 1971), pp. 3-19.
15. For a different view, see Mark V. Pauly,
National Health Insurance: An Analysis,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research. Washington, D.C., August, 1971.
16. For a list of bills, see Appendix.
17. For studies of other countries, see M.
H. Cooper and A. J. Culyer, "An Economic
Survey of the Nature and Intent of the British
National Health Service" Social Science and
Medicine 5, 1 (February, 1971), pp. 1-12;
William A. Glaser, Paying the Doctor: Sys-
tems of Remuneration and Their Effects
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) ; Mil-
ton I. Roemer, The Organisation of Medical
Care Under Social Security (Geneva: Interna-
tional Labour Office, 1969).
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TABLE 1-POLICY VARIABLES RELEVANT TO NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS
analyzed in terms of the dimensions of
its policy variables. In Table 1 are
presented nine variables subject to ma-
nipulation by social policy, and some of
their dimensions
Choice among the plans may be seen
to be basically determined by three sets
of considerations: (1) socio-political,
economic, and ideological criteria relat-
ing to the effects of the various policy
variables; ( 2 ) perceptions of political
feasibility; and (3) the evaluation of
the present system.
Those who perceive the market sys-
tem and its outcomes as basically ac-
ceptable but in need of improvement for
certain population groups and in certain
&dquo;catastrophic&dquo; situations, and who wish
to limit the role of government while
enhancing private decision-making with-
in a pluralistic system, recommend plans
of the LCV type. Thus, several plans
urging &dquo;major risk insurance&dquo; or &dquo;varia-
ble subsidy insurance&dquo; or &dquo;tax credit
insurance&dquo; have been proposed by indi-
viduals and introduced by representa-
tives of two of the major interest groups
involved, the AMA and the insurance
carriers.19 The Administration’s pro-
18. For a detailed discussion and analysis,
see Sylvester E. Berki, "Economic Effects of
National Health Insurance" Inquiry 8, 2 (June,
1971), pp. 37-55.
19. For example, see Martin S. Feldstein,
"A New Approach to National Health Insur-
ance," The Public Interest, Spring, 1971, pp.
93-105; Pauly, op. cit.; Charles W. Baird, "A
Proposal for Financing the Purchase of
Health Services," Journal of Human Re-
sources 5, 1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 89-105;
Jeffrey H. Weiss, "A Proposal for Financing
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posal, the &dquo;National Health Insurance
Partnership Act of 19 71,&dquo; falls into this
category.2°
On the other side are those who see
the present system as chaotic and un-
remediable and who do not believe that
uncontrolled private decision-making is
possible or desirable. An outstanding
critic of some forty years’ standing is
I. S. Falk, who attributes the present
crisis to four basic factors:
1. National shortages in various cate-
gories of health manpower and facili-
ties ;
2. Steeply rising costs and their fi-
nancing ;
3. Inadequacies in the system for the
availability and provision of care; and
4. Lack of sufficient controls for the
assurance of quality of care.21
Falk specifies the dimensions of pol-
icy variables in terms that lead to a
plan that would be Total, Comprehen-
sive, and Compulsory. The plan he
proposes would provide &dquo;all useful and
promising medical care services&dquo; to the
&dquo;whole population ... without finan-
cial tests or barriers&dquo; within a system
restructured &dquo;on an evolutionary
course.&dquo; In addition, he would require
the establishment of fiscal and quality
standards, to be enforced through public
accountability.22 The only bill calling
for a plan in this category is the &dquo;Health
Security Act&dquo; introduced by Senator
Edward Kennedy.23
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
It is obvious, or should be, that no
policy design and no policy result can be
evaluated in the absence of criteria that
are both relevant and accepted. We
suggest eight criteria categories in
terms of which the policy variables of
NHI proposals may be evaluated. It
may be argued that they require infor-
mation at unattainable levels, and in
fact that is one of the prime arguments
used to buttress the incrementalist ap-
proach to policy formation: if you don’t
know all the facts, muddle through by
meddling. Nonetheless, the introduc-
tion of any plan is likely to have signifi-
cant impacts within each of the cate-
gories for which the criteria are pro-
posed, either by changing existing ar-
rangements or by rigidifying them. The
criteria for choice may be briefly enu-
merated :
1. Institutional Effects:
How and to what extent do the policy
variables affect existing economic, so-
cial, and political institutions? What
are likely impacts on private markets,
on the relationships between the federal/
state/local governmental structures, on
voluntarism, and on the work ethic?
2. Income Distribution Effects:
How would the distribution of income
be affected? What are the income and
investment effects of the plan likely to
be? What are considered adequate in-
come levels, acceptable and unacceptable
cost burdens of beneficiaries? What are
the income effects on providers?
3. Health Distribution Effects:
How is the plan likely to affect the
distribution of health in society, when
the Purchase of Health Services: A Com-
ment," Journal of Human Resources 6, 1
(Winter, 1971), pp. 123-124; H.R. 4960,
"Health Care Insurance Act" ("Medicredit"),
supported by the AMA; H.R. 4349, "National
Health Care Act," supported by the Health
Insurance Association of America; and see
Appendix.
20. H.R. 7741, and S. 1623, see Appendix.
21. I. S. Falk, "National Policies and Pro-
grams for the Financing of Medical Care,"
the 1971 Michael M. Davis Lecture, Center
for Health Administration Studies, Graduate
School of Business, University of Chicago, p.
4.
22. Ibid., pp. 10-12. 23. S. 3, see Appendix.
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health is defined technically by the medi-
cal profession as well as by the patient
and by social norms?
4. Production and Allocative Eyl-
ciency Effects:
Does the program enhance the use of
technically efficient methods to attain its
objectives? Do program beneficiaries
receive what and how much they in fact
desire and what the program envisages?
Are induced changes in demands eco-
nomically &dquo;rational&dquo; and would they
elicit requisite changes in supplies?
What are the mechanisms for equilibrat-
ing demands and supplies?
5. Dynamic Effects:
Is the program likely to stimulate, or
to inhibit, innovation? Is it sufficiently
flexible to accommodate unforeseen
changes in basic parameters of both the
medical care system and the larger econ-
omy ?
6. Macro Effects:
What would be the program effects on
national economic policies, such as price
stabilization? What are desirable pri-
vate/public mixes, and how would the
program affect these? What would be
the effects on federal and state tax bases
and budgets? What would be the total
cost effects?
7. Benefit Effects:
Are the methods of providing benefits
consistent with social criteria, if they
are applicable? For example, are they
nondemeaning, or do they require means
tests? Is benefit discrimination by in-
come levels acceptable ?
8. Acceptability Effects:
Are the specified policy variables ac-
ceptable to the major groups affected
by them? Are the interests of the
major interest groups (physicians and
other individual providers, hospitals and
other institutional providers, insurance
carriers, labor unions, and patients)
reconciled?
Congressional bills, as one would ex-
pect, do not explicitly mention nor refer
to many of these criteria. But the title
of the act, &dquo;National Health Insurance
Partnership,&dquo; (italics added), not to
mention its emphasis on the role of pri-
vate insurance carriers and physician
payment on the basis of &dquo;reasonable
charges&dquo; (subject to the limits of re-
tained Medicare provisions), explicitly
recognizes the desirability of maintain-
ing the existing system, and within it,
the roles of its dominant constituents.
Other proposals assign explicit values
to some of the criteria. Assuming that
medical care is not basically different
from other economic goods, and hence
its distribution could best be achieved
in a system &dquo;which lets consumers de-
cide, on the basis of outcomes, which
arrangement they like best,&dquo; 14 Pauly
makes the traditional free-market argu-
ment, recognizing the usually unstated
implications in terms of income effects:
Another effect would be to increase the
incomes and prices of inputs. In a freely
functioning market, the effect of such in-
creases would be, first, to induce existing
producers to supply more output and,
eventually, to entice more producers into
the market. One might not like the fact
that existing producers would be earning
higher incomes. But the higher incomes
are necessary to attract new resources. 25
Still others are explicit indeed in urg-
ing specific criteria by which to evalu-
ate the policy variables of any plan:
24. Pauly, op. cit., p. 16.
25. Ibid., p. 38. Few, if any, analysts would
agree either that the medical service markets
are "free" in the sense of competitive or that
there is a need for, say, additional beds. This
is an example of the "as if" fallacy, that is,
let’s assume the markets would react as if
they were free.
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The Medical Committee for Human Rights
(MCHR) believes certain principles should
underlie any health care in America.
1. All Americans are equally entitled to
complete and preventive health care, with
no charge at the time of service. Health
services should be easily accessible in every
community.
2. Health care should be paid for by a
progressive national tax on total wealth-
a tax without loopholes that makes the
very rich pay their share.
3. No one should gain profit from sick-
ness, misery, and death of others. There
should be an end to profit-making in
health care.
4. Health care institutions should be
locally controlled by representatives of
patients and health workers.
5. Race and sex discrimination should be
ended for health workers. Minorities,
women, and the poor should he justly rep-
resented in all health jobs.26
Consider now the contours and some
of the details of three major plans in
terms of the policy variables we have
specified.
THE NIXON, KENNEDY, AND lB1EDI-
CREDIT PLANS FOR NHI
For ease of comparison, in table 2 the
dimensions of the policy variables are
presented in tabular form. Significant
differences in approach become obvious
even upon brief inspection of the char-
acteristics of the three major plans.
The Kennedy plan would provide es-
sentially all useful medical services to all
the population without regard to income
and without the requirement of any
direct payment by the patient at the
time service is received. Both the Nixon
plan and Medicredit require payment at
the time of service and treat people at
different income levels differently.
Medicredit provides fairly comprehen-
sive benefits, except in long-term illness,
regardless of the patient’s income. But
since it is based on tax credit financing,
Medicredit does require registration and
a means test to qualify for the insurance
certificate when the tax liability of the
potential beneficiary is zero. Contrary
to all available evidence of higher &dquo;inci-
dence of medical needs at lower income
levels, the Nixon plan provides much
lower levels of benefits for the poor and
the unemployed than for others.27
Further, excluding the poor without
children, it then establishes no less than
35 income-family size categories for
differential benefit coverage and pre-
mium payments. To qualify, the family
must pass a means test demonstrating
income sufficiently low to meet the cri-
teria (welfare payments are included in
income) and further, that, other than
home, household goods, and personal
effects, its resources are below $1,500.
Once these qualifications have been met
and the family members certified eligi-
ble, that eligibility is for six months
only: each family must be re-examined
and recertified every six months. Note
that only families with at least one
member under the age of 18 (22, if in
school) and unmarried, qualify-even if
they could pass the means test.2$
The manner in which services would
be utilized and quality standards estab-
lished is not mentioned by Medicredit
at all and only vaguely in the Nixon
plan.29 Medicredit specifically prohib-
its
... any Federal officer or employe to exer-
cise any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine or the manner in
which medical services are provided, over
the selection, tenure, or compensation of
any officer or employe, or any institution,
26. Preliminary Position Paper on National
Health Care (Chicago: The Medical Com-
mittee for Human Rights, September, 1971).
27. A. L. Strauss, "Medical Organization,
Medical Care and Lower Income Groups,"
Social Science and Medicine, vol. 3, 1969, pp.
143-177.
28. H.R. 7741, Section 625.
29. H.R. 4960, Section 2023.
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agency, or person providing health services;
or to exercise any supervision or control
over the administration or operation of any
such institution, agency, or person.
While the Nixon Plan relies on the in-
herent utilization and quality advan-
tages of the HMO, the Kennedy plan
goes far in specifying explicit standards
of quality and utilization to be enforced
by the Health Security Board.30 The
potential for outside auditing of medical
practice by a public body is established.
The reliance on public operations is
equally evident in the Kennedy plan’s
specification of the administrative mech-
anism. Both Medicredit and the Nixon
plan rely on private institutions within
a market framework, regulated more in
the Nixon plan and less in Medicredit.
In requiring that all employers with
more than one hundred employes make
the option of joining an HMO available,
the Nixon plan takes several steps in the
Kennedy plan’s direction-which, by
manipulation of the incentive and pay-
ment mechanisms, endeavors to make
the CHSO the basic provision system for
medical services.
Increasing the Health Security Tax
base to $15,000 from its current Social
Security income limit of $7,800, impos-
ing a tax on certain unearned and hence
presently untaxed incomes, and requir-
ing matching by general revenue funds,
the Kennedy plan is potentially much
more progressive in its financing mech-
anism than either of the other plans.
By the use of incentives, sanctions,
administrative mechanisms, means of
provider payment, and the CHSO, the
Kennedy plan envisages a restructured
system of co6rdinated comprehensive
services administered on a regional basis.
The patchwork approach of the other
two plans assumes that the current sys-
tem is workable and that since almost
all Americans have some form of health
insurance, the best policy is filling the
gaps to fit the bill.
EFFECT OF EACH PLAN ON A FAMILY
Consider the effect of each of these
plans on a hypothetical family of four
with a gross income of $6,000. For
purposes of comparison, a rather long
period of hospitalization is assumed,
precisely to show the differential im-
pacts of the plans under currently
pauperizing circumstances. While the
Kennedy plan would reduce income by
more than either of the two plans in
the case of no disease, it would provide
much more complete security in case of
illness. As can be seen in table 3, while
Medicredit would provide essentially al-
most complete financial coverage, under
the Nixon plan the family’s income
would be reduced by over $1,000, or
some 20 percent. And note that this is
the result of the cost of services, and
not the loss of income resulting from
inability to work should the patient be
the wage earner.
Even though &dquo;progressivity&dquo; is built
into the Kennedy plan, implying that
the increase in income taxes under the
plan would be higher than $100 at higher
income levels, it may be argued that the
assumed tax increase is low since the
plan would be very costly. John G.
Veneman, Undersecretary of the De-
partment of Health, Education, and
Welfare, has suggested that the cost of
the Kennedy plan in its first full year of
operation would be $77 billion dollars.31
Consider, therefore, the cost estimates
provided by HEW.
The two striking aspects of the data
presented in table 4 are that health costs
30. On the concept of the HMO, see Paul
M. Ellwood, Jr. et al., "Health Maintenance
Strategy," Medical Care 9, 3 (May-June,
1971), pp. 291-298.
31. Senate Committee on Labor and Pub-
lic Welfare, Hearings on S. 4323 and S. 3830,
National Health Insurance, 91st Cong. 2d Ses-
sion, September 23, 1970, p. 200.
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TABLE 3-FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF THREE MAJOR PROPOSALS ON A
HYPOTHETICAL FAMILY OF FOUR WITH AN ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME
OF $6,000 IN 1970, IF THE VARIOUS PLANS HAD BEEN IN EFFECT
ASSUMPTIONS: 1970 tax rates, without surcharge, apply. Services and their prices hypothesized:
45 days of in-patient care @ $80/day; 8 office visits @ $10/visit; 10 prescriptions @ $3/Rx; 1 pair
of glasses @ $12. These are very conservative assumptions since no consultations or other pro-
cedures usually separately charged in the hospital are assumed to have occurred. Deductibles and
co-payments calculated according to provisions of relevant Bills. Tax credit under Medicredit is
calculated after including 80% of employer-paid premium of $200, for total premium cost of $450.
Under Nixon plan, premium is assumed to be $350, with employe paying 35%. Assumed utilization
is well below average for office visits and much above average for hospital care, purposely to indicate
financial effects of hypothetical serious illness.
TABLE 4-ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES UNDER VARIOUS
PROPOSALS, AND UNDER No PLAN, AFTER TAX ADJUSTMENT, BASED ON
1970 EXPENDITURES AND TRENDS, FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974
(in billions of dollars)
~ ~ --~ ---
SOURCE: A Study of National Health Insurance Proposals... Supplementary Report, Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, July, 1971, pp. 2-9.
* After adjustments for tax deductions and revenue loss.
# Total federal expenditures are somewhat overstated, since they include war-related and other
international expenditures, e.g., in millions by agency: Department of Defense, $1,900; Agency for
International Development, $97; Department of State, $30; etc. See &dquo;Special Analysis K,&dquo; 6’. S.
Budget, Fiscal 1971. Office of Management and Budget, Table K-15, p. 171.
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are estimated to increase by over $38
billion in four years if there is no plan
at all, and that the cost differentials
among the plans are at most $6.6 bil-
lion. That the reliability of the esti-
mates is open to question is recognized
by their authors Assumed changes in
cost increases, in utilization rates, in
administrative costs, and the like, do not
consider adequately that both Medi-
credit and, to a lesser extent, the Nixon
plan would create a financial funnel
into the present bottomless pit.33 Nor
is it clear why, under the Kennedy plan,
when basically comprehensive services
except, initially, dental care would be
provided, individual direct payments
would remain at $11 billion, with
&dquo;health insurance&dquo; payments at almost
$2 billion.
The assumption of random estimation
error is dangerous and probably incor-
rect, hence the cost estimates of the
various plans may be unevenly biased.
Nevertheless, consider that the predicted
induced, or additional, costs of the Ken-
nedy plan according to DHEW are
shown to be $8.4 billion-somewhat at
variance with the same administration’s
publicized estimate of $77 billion for the
plan. The HEW Report, however,
states that &dquo;the net additional cost to
the Federal taxpayer is therefore esti-
mated at $59.4 billion.&dquo; 34 The $59.4
billion is derived by deducting from
total program cost (113.8) private sec-
tor and state and local government costs
(15.9 + 6.5) to get the federal share of
91.4; and then comparing the federal
share under the plan with what it would
be without one, $32 billion. It is rea-
sonable to assume that few if any indi-
viduals who do not pay any federal in-
come taxes would be among those who
would spend the $62.3 billion in direct
payments and premiums if there were
no plan at all. In fact, the HEW analy-
sis itself shows that private payments
would be reduced by $51.4 billion under
the Kennedy plan. The net additional
costs to the federal taxpayers, there-
fore, would be on the order of $8 bil-
lion, and not $59 billion: private direct
payments would be reduced by $51 bil-
lion and tax payments would increase
by some $59 billion. For political con-
siderations it might well be important
that direct payments would be replaced
by tax payments. But this would rep-
resent no additional payments. It also
would have important income distribu-
tion effects by shifting support of the
sick poor from the sick middle-income
group to a new basis: support of the
sick, regardless of income, by the
healthy, graduated by income. Depend-
ing on the criteria one applies, this may
or may not be desirable. But one thing
is clear: additional costs to the taxpayer
would not be $77 billion, nor $59 billion.
By the HEW estimate itself, they might
be $8 billion.
It has, however, been argued that, re-
gardless of the accuracy of the cost esti-
mates, no program of major proportions
could be instituted because existing
medical personnel and facilities would
be incapable of meeting the ensuing de-
mands for services. The implications of
this argument are made clear by Rashi
Fein:
I reject the argument, &dquo;Let’s wait,&dquo; for
what seems to me to be a most compelling
reason. Suppose it is true that the system
simply cannot handle more demand. To
conclude from that that we should not
have national health insurance is to con-
clude that we should continue to distribute
32. A Study of National Health Insurance
Proposals Introduced in the 92d Congress, a
Supplementary Report to Congress, Depart-
ment of HEW, July, 1971, p. 13.
33. See Mike Gorman, "The Impact of Na-
tional Health Insurance on Delivery of
Health Care," AJPH 61, 5 (May, 1971), pp.
962-971; Elliott A. Krause, "Health and the
Politics of Technology," Inquiry 8, 3 (Sep-
tember, 1971), pp. 51-59.
34. A Study (see note 32), p. 44.
141
the limited supply of medical resources on
the basis of ability to pay. I believe that
this is inequitable and indefensible.
Should not the limited supply be avail-
able to all Americans-not only to those
who are in fortunate enough economic
circumstances to be able to pay the market
price and compete against their neighbors?
Those who say we cannot meet the de-
mands must recognize that means we are
rationing the supply, and I do not believe
medical care should be rationed on the
basis of ability to pay.35
The Nixon and Medicredit plans,
then, by rather similar marginalist ap-
proaches, would create a federally man-
dated national voluntary private system
to finance some of the costs of medical
care. Both plans would be relatively
more beneficial to the middle-income
groups. Both would treat the poor dif-
ferently ; each would reinforce the dou-
ble standard of care: one for the rich,
a fraction for the poor. By providing
for the ill-defined HMO, the Nixon plan
would encourage some change in the
supply system. Medicredit would not
alter the system but would reinforce
those very characteristics which have
led to the ubiquitous cries of &dquo;crisis.&dquo;
Of the other plans we have not dis-
cussed, the Scott/Percy, Burleson, and
Pell/Mondale Bills are similar in basic
respects to Medicredit, except for their
financing mechanism. In its target
benefits, the Burleson bill (also known
as the Aetna bill, after its major sup-
porter) is even less complete than the
Nixon bill. It could truly be called a
&dquo;Buffalo Bill&dquo;:
It reminds me of the old Buffalo policy.
There are deductibles, co-insurance clauses,
exclusions, loopholes and gaps-so much
fine print that it resembles the policy that
covers you only when you are run over by
TABLE 5-HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS,
HOGAN BILL
a herd of Buffalo in downtown Detroit-
at high noon .36
Taking a systematic approach to the
intertwined problems of health care, the
Kennedy plan would reorganize the sys-
tem by providing for the evolution of
publicly accountable, publicly financed,
publicly regulated comprehensive pri-
vate systems of care for all, regardless
of income. Based on a fairly progressive
financial mechanism, it would re-allocate
resources over time to alter the present
maldistribution, and make care accessi-
ble to all. Ameriplan, not yet in legis-
lative form, would be somewhat similar
to the Kennedy plan in many respects,
with its emphasis on the health care
corporation, while enshrining the hos-
pital as not only the technical but also
the legal and institutional fulcrum of
care. The Javits bill falls somewhat in
the middle between the Nixon and the
Kennedy plans. By expanding Medi-
care, it would cover all persons but it
would also retain all the Buffalo char-
acteristics : co-payments, deductibles,
limitations on service, exclusions, delays.
We have not discussed any of the so-
called catastrophic-illness insurance
plans. An example, perhaps, will dem-
onstrate why. The Hogan bill, H.R.
817, is designed to provide insurance
against the costs of catastrophic illness.
The benefits are a function of family in-
come, that is, they are reduced by a
deductible to be paid by the family.
35. Hearings, (see note 31), Part 2, Septem-
ber 24, 1970, p. 372.
36. Leonard Woodcock, quoted in The New
York Times, Wednesday, April 28, 1971.
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For a family of four, H.R. 817 estab-
lishes the deductible schedule found in
table 5. This bill appears to be de-
signed to achieve complete equality
among the seriously ill: all incomes
would be reduced to $4,500-except at
the $2 5,000 level. There they would
be reduced to $2,500.
CONCLUSION
There are many specific issues in-
volved in the choice of a plan; some we
have discussed and some we have not.
Important among these issues are the
methods to increase the availability and
accessibility of resources responsive to
patient needs, and the means of chan-
neling patients into and within the sys-
tem.
We have demonstrated that there are
vast differences among the present plans
and that the choice is not between one
or another method of financing. The
choice is between systems for providing
useful medical services.
If after sixty years the idea of na-
tional health insurance is not to be still-
born once again, the challenges are clear:
1. Elimination of barriers to access to
treatment, be they caused by individual
financial limitations, systemic disorgani-
zation, or resource shortages;
2. Incorporation into the mainstream
of medicine modern technological and
managerial advances while rekindling
the humanistic idea that a patient is not
a set of organ systems, but a person in
a social system;
3. Development of mechanisms of
public accountability to assure not only
the quality of care given but also that
all those who may benefit from care in
fact receive it;
4. Achievement of these ends within
the pluralistic American framework of
balanced power at reasonable cost.
Although the Kennedy bill represents a
good first step, none of the proposals for
NHI meet these objectives.
The basic question is not &dquo;What will
it cost?&dquo; The basic question is &dquo;What
is it we want?&dquo; If it is high quality
medical care for all Americans regard-
less of income, color, social class, or loca-
tion, the challenge is to devise a work-
able system to provide that at the low-
est cost.
Just as our National Government has
moved to provide equal opportunity in areas
such as education, employment, and voting,
so we must now work to expand the oppor-
tunity for all our citizens to obtain a decent
standard of medical care. We must do all
we can to remove any racial, economic, so-
cial, or geographic barriers which now pre-
vent any of our citizens from obtaining
adequate health care protection. For with-
out good health, no man can fully utilize
his other opportunities.37
37. President Nixon’s Health&mdash;A Message
from the President of the United States Rela-
tive to Building a National Health Strategy,
92d Congress, 1st Session, House Document
No. 92-49, February 18, 1971, p. 2.
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APPENDIX
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS AND RELATED PROPOSALS INTRODUCED
IN THE 92ND CONGRESS, AND OTHER PROPOSALS
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NoTE: TCC = Total, Comprehensive, Compulsory; LCV = Limited, Categorical, Voluntary.
OTHER PROPOSED PLANS
Major Risk Insurance: Martin S. Feldstein, &dquo;A New Approach to National Health Insurance,&dquo; The
Public Interest, Spring, 1971, pp. 93-105.
Variable Subsidy Insurance: Mark V. Pauly, National Health Insurance: An Analysis, American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Special Analysis 8, August, 1971.
Tax Credit Plan: Charles W. Baird, &dquo;A Proposal for Financing the Purchase of Health Services,&dquo; The
Journal of Human Resources 5, 1 (W’inter, 1970), pp. 89-105.
Postpayment Plan: R. D. Eilers, &dquo;Postpayment Medical Expense Coverage: A Proposed Salvation
for Insured and Insurer,&dquo; Blue Cross Reports, Research Series 1, September, 1969.
Ameriplan: &dquo;Ameriplan-A Proposal for the Delivery and Financing of Health Services in the United
States,&dquo; Report of a Special Committee on the Provision of Health Services, American Hospital
Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1970.
